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Computer Based Inquiring Systems Based Upon
Gadamerian Precepts: A Critique
by

David Vance
Department of Management
Southern Illinois University
INTRODUCTION
Boland, Tenkasi and Te'eni have written an interesting and provocative article titled "Designing
Information Technology to Support Distributed Cognition." My purpose here is to examine the article's
recommendation and suggest reasons why these might not be reasonably attainable in practice. I will argue
that the proposed inquiring system architecture is philosophically flawed, not workable in actual practice,
and most of all, not necessary.

BENEFITS OF GADMERIAN INQUIRING SYSTEMS
Boland, et al conceive of distributed cognition as facilitated by computer software as a marked
improvement over our present organizational communications milieu. Their conceptualization is
characterized by openness and the generation of large numbers of alternative views on matters of group
focus. Using a system that enables the sharing of cognitive maps, organizational thinkers are better able to
understand the assumptions and models used by other members of the group. This makes for increased
understanding and the sharing of meaning. Plato analogized in the Fable of the Cave that without shared
experiential references there can be no shared meaning. Boland, et al, seek to describe a computer-based
communication system which, through the use of its various displays, would be able to capture the
meanings of the giving mind with such fidelity that something akin to shared experience might be created.
The benefits of such an environment are manifold. As the world becomes more complex and turbulent,
strategies designed around stability and predictability are less effective[7]. Complex environments require
an increased flexibility to accommodate unpredictable shifts. The impact of globalization, fueled by
technological change is creating these discontinuities[8]. In order to effectively respond, an organization
needs to mobilize all the cognitive resources at its disposal. Calls for universal participation [15], systems
level thinking and conceptualizing [12] and a leadership characterized by organizational transformation [3]
are symptomatic of a growing awareness of the problem. Since organizations learn experientially [10], a
network that would facilitate the sharing of individual member experience to the group would expedite
organizational learning. All these concerns would seem to be answered by the proposed computer-based
inquiring system.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST GADAMERIAN INQUIRING SYSTEMS
Philosophical Problems
Yet there are difficulties in the concept as put forward. First of all, I claim that it is philosophically flawed.
By this I mean that Boland et al have chosen an unconventional stream of hermeneutics upon which to base
their system. There are two competing positions in hermeneutics: the first follows Dilthey and sees
interpretation as a method for the human sciences. The methodology for trying to determine what an author
meant is a typical problem for this approach. In my mind, this is the more conventional concept of
hermeneutics. The second type follows Heidegger and sees interpretation as an "ontological event", an
interaction between interpreter and text that is part of the history of what is understood [1, 9]. Under this
approach, there is no original meaning discoverable, because the very act of interpretation alters both the
message and the reader. Boland, et al, base their understanding on the work of Gadamer, who is a student
of Heidegger, and of the same basic school as the post-structuralists Derrida and Foucault. One must

wonder why, since the conventional wisdom in the field is to follow Dilthey, the authors choose Gadamer.
What are the ramifications of this decision? Of crucial importance here is to appreciate that for Gadamer,
since interpretation is an ontological event and ontology is the study of "being" or reality then,
interpretation creates reality. Let me expand upon this point by looking closer at the "ontological event" as
a basis for interpretation.
In the following discussion, I will use the unfamiliar words and phrases of Heidegger (as translated). While
this makes for slower reading, I feel that paraphrasing the translation would remove vital cues from the
language and perhaps make his conceptualizations unclear. For Heidegger, the fundamental of reality is
something called Being which is, perhaps, best understood as universal existence. Being is purposive and
destining, but cannot become in or of itself, but must have man as a collaborator to discover what Being
wishes next to become. What we would call creativity is actually Being bringing forth that which is created
through the man. Being is allowing itself to be revealed or discovered in this process. Any veranlassen
(bringing forth) is a manner of human entbergen (discovery), but no human entbergen can be self
contained; Being must attend. In terms of our present discussion, the act of interpretation is also in the
manner of creativity. Being is allowing itself to be revealed in the interpretive act, and in the process
changing reality in which the message and the interpreter existed. There can be no interpretive "end", for
each interpretation yields a changed reality.
I think these notions are fairly exotic to the taste of the average American manager. The idea of some
metaphysical entity revealing itself in the daily acting out of organizational activity seems fairly bizarre.
Further, this logic leads inevitably to the unavailability of any knowable ultimate meaning, goals or truth.
The only possibility is a series of contingent truths linking into some inscrutable pattern as Being discovers
itself. This must yield the "hermeneutic circle". The circularity of interpretation concerns the relations of
parts to the whole: the interpretation of each part is dependent on the interpretation of the whole. But
interpretation is circular in a stronger sense; if every interpretation is itself based upon interpretation, then
the circle of interpretation even if not viscous, cannot be escaped [1].
Hans-Georg Gadamer radicalize this notion of the hermeneutic circle, seeing it as a feature of all
knowledge and activity. Hermeneutics is then no longer the method of the human sciences but "universal,"
and interpretation is part of the finite and situated character of all human knowing. Positively, it emphasizes
understanding as well as openness, in which prejudices are challenged and horizons broadened.[1] The
question I must ask is whether the ontological price is worth it. Can such a notion ever find acceptance in
our culture?
Practicality Problems
My second premise is that the proposed system is not workable in actual practice. I cite three basic areas
where Boland's ideas are so in conflict with common understanding as to render them virtually useless.
These areas are the nature of organizations and organizational management, the nature of knowledge and
the nature of civilized society.
The Nature Of Organizations And Organizational Management
Typical organizational identity is characterized by homogenization within, but differentiation between units
[4]. Organizations are also beset with characteristic mindsets that are part of the institutional fabric [5, 11].
These create skepticism about external or different world views. This discourages divergence within and
encourages divergence from external viewpoints. This is discordant with the espoused view of divulging
personal mental maps. Further, the classic definition of management is the attainment of organizational
goals in an effective and efficient manner [4]. This generally means finding the shortest distance to the
goal, not the most picturesque. At a deeper level, the criteria by which management is judged a very strong
driver of organizational behavior[6] and currently are far more pragmatic than the proposed system would
allow. Without a significant and perhaps traumatic change in performance criteria, the proposed system
could not function. Consider that managerial activity is characterized by variety, brevity and fragmentation

[4]. which stands in stark contrast to the proposal for managers to "regularly reflect on existing
assumptions, processes and structures" as the authors suggest.
The Nature Of Knowledge
There is another difficulty created by the difference between how Boland sees knowledge and what we find
in organization. When called upon to solve organizational problems, an evolution which most accurately
describes the situation Boland thinks most appropriate to his "spider-net" map-sharing software, we find a
phenomenon called "sticky information" [14]. Information needed to solve problems is held by individuals.
For a number of reasons, this information does not easily transfer from the holder to the person needing it.
One reason for this may be that the information is "tacit." That is to say, inculcated into the holder at such a
level as to be inarticulable [14]. Were the holder to wish to explain his knowledge, he might well find
himself unable to do so, even with the best mind-mapping software. Further, that such sharing requires a
level of requisite understanding in the receiver that mitigates against knowledge transfer because it raises
the "transfer cost" to an unacceptable level. This raises a deeper issue: If knowledge transfer is blocked
because of excessive costs and currently those costs are mainly borne by the receiver of knowledge, is it not
reasonable to expect a greater resistance to knowledge sharing if all or most of the cost is placed upon the
holder? Since the model's mind-mapping software requires the knowledge holder to explicate his
understanding in myriad linked pictograms, I would guess that this further burden would make knowledge
transfer an arduous and odious process.
The Nature Of Civilized Society
The third of the arguments against practical workability of Boland's idea is my understanding of the nature
of civilized society. Shapin explains trust, civil order and the level of explication in the following quote.
The maintenance of everyday order is actively maintained by a complex set of practices that motivated
actors use to constitute 'interpretive trust.' These practices notably include trusting as a routine, not
inquiring too far or too much, not seeking to go too deeply beyond the 'face value' of things, letting the
quality of knowledge be 'sufficient to the day' [13].
It is clear that this is opposite to intent of Boland's inquiring system. We might predict that excessive
inquiry has the effect of ungluing relationships, organizations and society, rather than bringing them
together. Understanding might foster more divisiveness than does silence.
Gadamerian Inquirers Are Not Required
My last argument is that the proposed system is simply not necessary. In order to maintain close
relationships with its most sophisticated customer group, Microsoft has developed the Microsoft Developer
Network (MSDN)[7]. This "network" ties extremely influential and knowledgeable customers to Microsoft
in such a manner as to facilitate idea sharing in such a facile manner that Microsoft has been able to
achieve worldwide eminence in its brief 15 year history. Obviously they have overcome the problems of
the managerial environment, the freeing of sticky, tacit, and difficult to transfer information, as well as the
issues of social propriety, while avoiding philosophical the quicksand of unending interpretive loops. While
making extensive use of information technology, that technology is largely background. Human contact
and interaction is the primary experience, and this is reinforced by an unusual amount of feedback to keep
the communicator involved[7]. This also facilitates the finding of meaning through extensive dialogue.
MSDN works on a set of firmly held objectives, specifically:

1. to greatly increase the amount and richness of bi-directional information flow,
2. to open new channels of communication where none exist, and most importantly,
3. that the emphasis of technology be on performing tasks that cannot be accomplished manually,
rather than on automating those tasks already performed by humans.

While not designed to increase productivity or reduce costs, this system is contributing to Microsoft's
globally recognized success. Perhaps we would be well advised to follow the example Microsoft has set.

CONCLUSION
Is interpersonal communication a task that cannot be accomplished without computer assistance? I think
not. In an environment that cultivates trust, mutual appreciation and an awareness of interdependence, the
three simple directives of Microsoft can accomplish all the benefits of the proposed computer-based
system, while avoiding the philosophical and personal pitfalls. Functional and positive communication is a
task best handled in an atmosphere of trust. Perhaps there are levels of trust that correspond to the costs
seen to be reasonable in the acquisition and deliverance of knowledge. More "expensive" information
transfers only in environments of heightened trust.
Certainly, and colloquially, the benefits of universal verbal understanding have been understood from the
time of the story of the Tower of Babel. What does Boland's technique really afford that face to face
communication could not? Does it enhance trust? Does it "sweep in" emotive components of a perspective
only to afford an unwanted invasion of personal belief? Does it create, then victimize a sub-set of
technological "elites", who are first to learn the new methods of idea representation, then the first to be
harmed by over-exposure? Does it create an underclass of managers unable or unwilling (as we have
discussed) to expose their "cognitive maps" to anonymous scrutiny? In its designed function of
complicating issues, can it create an intellectual and emotional quagmire which allows no significant
progress? Is there a way to facilitate open dialog within organizations without taking on the burden of the
inescapable hermeneutic circle where all meaning is contingent upon all other meaning and life and its
activities are degraded by relativistic banality? The answer, it seems to me, lies in better management, not
in more invasive technology.

